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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide information on the perceived effectiveness of 56 
fraud-detecting standard audit procedures normally used in stock and warehousing cycle, and 
to examine auditor- and audit firm-specific factors that influence the likelihood of detecting 
fraud in stock and warehousing cycle in New Zealand.  We gathered data through a mail 
survey of New Zealand auditors in order to ascertain their opinion on the effectiveness of 
these audit procedures.  The results suggest that relatively few (less than half) of the 56 
standard audit procedures are perceived by our surveyed auditors as being “more effective” in 
detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle.  Further, more than half of the 56 audit 
procedures are perceived by respondents as “moderately effective” in detecting fraud.  
Fifteen audit procedures are perceived as being “less effective” in detecting fraud the stock 
and warehousing audit cycle. 
 
A univariate analysis reveals no significant perpetual differences among our respondents on 
the basis of the location of their employers in New Zealand, and the type of audit firm 
employing them.  We employed logit regression analysis to test a model to predict the 
likelihood of detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle, given certain auditor- and audit 
firm-specific factors.  The results of the regression analysis suggest that size of audit firm 
(measured by the number of employees), auditor’s position tenure, and auditor’s years of 
experience are statistically significant predictors of the likelihood of detecting fraud in stock 
and warehousing cycle in New Zealand.  Thus, the likelihood of fraud detection in stock and 
warehousing increases as the auditor acquires more years of auditing experience, and with the 
audit firms employing more members of staff. 
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1. Introduction and Literature Overview 
 
Corporate fraud1 is on the increase worldwide.  The United Kingdom’s Audit Commission, 
for example, reports that the number of frauds has increased by 38 percent since 1990 (Tyler, 
1997).  Fraud is not only on the increase; it is also expensive.  The amount of money involved 
in 2,608 reported fraud cases over the last ten years, studied by the United States’ (US’s) 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), totalled US$15 billion (Mitchell, 1997). 
 
A study of fraud detection in the stock and warehousing cycle in New Zealand (NZ) context 
is topical.  The recent collapse of Fortex Group Limited was partly due to a fraud perpetuated 
in the stock and warehousing cycle.  The management of Fortex classified, and recorded low-
value lamb ribs as high-value French lamb legs as part of its year-end stock (Macfie, 1996).  
The external auditors of this company are believed not to have detected this fraudulent 
financial reporting (although legal action against the auditors on this issue was eventually 
settled out of court).  Losses to creditors of the company following Fortex’s collapse totalled 
about NZ$70 million (MacLennan, 1996).  A study assessing the perceived effectiveness of 
the audit procedures normally used in stock and warehousing cycle will be useful to NZ 
auditors, as a means of improving on their capacities to detect occurrences of similar 
incidents in their future audit engagements. 
 
A body of literature, commonly called the “red flag” literature, evolved in an attempt to deter 
and detect the likelihood of fraud occurring.  The red-flag literature suggests conditions under 
which fraud is more likely to occur (see Coopers and Lybrand, 1977; Elliott and Willingham, 
1980; Romney and Albrecht, 1980; Pincus, 1989; Albrecht et al., 1995 for further discussion 
of, and the literature on, red flags).  Although the red flag literature does provide some insight 
into the likelihood of fraud occurring, it has been criticised on three fronts.  First, the flags are 
rather general and subjective, and often may be present when no fraud has occurred (see 
Albrecht and Romney, 1986).  Second, it is difficult to operationalise the “red flags” in 
empirical research.  For example, a lack of management integrity has been cited as a “red 
flag” condition, yet how does one assess such a factor?  Finally, “red flags” are neither 
predictive nor absolute (Cottrell and Albrecht, 1994). 
 
Recent studies researching into the likelihood of detecting fraud have examined the use of 
audit procedures to detect fraud in a typical audit engagement (see, for example, Moyes and 
Baker, 1995; Moyes, 1996; Moyes and Hasan, 1996; Moyes and Lavine, 1997).  These 
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studies find that auditing experience of auditors and prior success of audit firms in detecting 
fraud are significant in detecting fraud.  In the stock and warehousing cycle, the size of audit 
firm is associated with greater likelihood of fraud detection (Moyes and Hasan, 1996).  
Techniques that directly collect evidence are seen to be more effective by auditors than those 
that indirectly collect evidence, and test stock valuation (Moyes, 1996). 
 
While the efficacy of the use of audit procedures to detect fraud has been tested, it is limited, 
in most cases, to auditors in the US.  This study, therefore, extends this research issue to NZ.  
Specifically, the purpose of the study is three-fold: (1) To assess the degree of fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of 56 standard audit procedures that are applicable to stock and warehousing 
cycle2; (2) To identify any perceptual differences of auditors in NZ on the effectiveness of 
each of the standard fraud-detecting audit procedures on the basis of: (i) regional location 
(Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and “others”), and (ii) type of audit firm (Big-5 and 
non-Big-5); and (3) To investigate the relative influence of four auditor and audit firm-
specific factors: (i) size of audit firm; (ii) position tenure of auditor; (iii) years of experience 
of auditor; and (iv) practice review experience of auditor’s firm on the likelihood of detecting 
fraud in stock and warehousing cycle.  Based on a priori reasoning and prior literature, we 
expect the four auditor- and audit firm-specific factors to have positive effects on the 
likelihood of detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle. 
 
The emphasis on stock and warehousing cycle is of significance.  First, stocks constitute a 
significant portion of corporate assets, both in absolute size and in proportion to all other 
assets on the balance sheet.  Second, stocks, most often, are held in different locations that 
make physical control and counting difficult.  Third, valuation of stocks is difficult due to 
such factors as obsolescence, and the need to allocate manufacturing costs to stocks.  Fourth, 
there are several acceptable stock valuation methods.  These factors make stocks more 
susceptible to fraud, and hence require a careful audit. 
 
According to Arens and Loebbecke (2000), the stock and warehousing cycle comprises of 
two separate, but closely related systems.  The first is the actual physical flow of goods, and 
the second is the related costs.  They identify five parts of stock and warehousing cycle that 
must be audited: (i) acquisition and recording of raw materials, labour and overheads; (ii) 
internal transfer of assets and related costs; (iii) shipping of goods and recording revenues 
and costs; (iv) physically observing stock; and (v) pricing and compiling stock.  Because 
fraud can occur in any of these parts of the stock and warehousing cycle, each part needs to 
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be audited.  This paper incorporates fraud–detecting audit procedures applicable to all five 
parts of the cycle. 
 
The layout of the reminder of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the research design 
and methodology employed, while Section 3 reports the results of the statistical analyses 
carried out on the survey data.  Section 4 concludes the paper with highlights on the 
limitations of the underlying research, and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2. Research Design and Methodology 
 
2.1 Sample Design and Sampling Method 
 
Public accountants practising (auditors) in NZ serve as our target population.  The target 
population was stratified on a regional basis (that is, Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and 
“others”).  It is expected that the extent of fraud occurring in different geographical areas in 
NZ may vary, and therefore the available audit procedures will vary in their fraud-detecting 
effectiveness.  In particular, because Auckland is a cosmopolitan city, we expect the 
possibility of fraud occurring to be relatively greater in Auckland (that is, “the big city 
effect”) than in the other regions examined.  Sampling units were drawn from each regional 
stratum.  This sampling method is preferred because it minimises the variability of population 
units within each regional stratum, while maximising the variability across strata. 
 
2.2 Survey Development and Administration 
 
We collected the data for the study through a questionnaire survey in the late 1999.  The 
survey instrument, which consisted of a cover letter, a pre-paid envelope and a questionnaire, 
was first mailed to 400 stratified auditors.3  Of these, 26 were returned to us by the postal 
agency as undeliverable.  One hundred and ten auditors responded with usable questionnaire, 
representing about 29 percent response rate.  Anonymity was promised to all respondents to 
the survey.  The questionnaire consists of three parts.  The first part collects demographic 
information about respondents.  The second part solicits their opinion on the degree of 
effectiveness of the 56 standard fraud-detecting audit procedures applicable to stock and 
warehousing cycle.  The respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on the degree of 
effectiveness of each of the 56 standard fraud-detecting audit procedures on a five-point 
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Likert-like response scale, which ranges from “not effective” (scored as one) to “extremely 
effective” (scored as five).  This measurement procedure was employed for two reasons.  
First, it is relatively easy for respondents to use, and responses from such a scale are likely to 
be reliable (Anderson et al., 1983).4  Second, the quasi interval features of the Likert scale 
render it appropriate for hypothesis testing of mean responses.  To understand why a 
respondent will not indicate his/her opinion on the effectiveness of a particular audit 
procedure, an additional column was provided alongside each audit procedure to be ticked in 
case of non-applicability. 
 
The third part of the questionnaire provides the respondents with an optional opportunity to 
contribute written comments on fraud-detecting techniques other than those indicated in the 
questionnaire that they have used in the stock and warehousing cycle. 
 
2.3 Methodology for Data Analysis 
 
Three main research themes were pursued in this study as follows: 
 
Effective audit procedures 
The mean response of all the respondents on each of the audit procedures was computed.  
This mean response on each audit procedure measures its degree of effectiveness in detecting 
fraud as perceived by the respondents.  As a supplementary analysis, an overall mean 
response of 3.0365 was also computed for the 56 audit procedures based on the usable 
returned questionnaire.  This overall mean response represent the perceived fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of a hypothetical average audit procedure in the stock and warehousing cycle.  
The overall mean response is used as a benchmark to determine the degree of effectiveness in 
detecting fraud for each audit procedure.  Significant differences between the overall mean 
response and the mean response for each audit procedure were tested with parametric One-
sample t-test, and are used to classify the audit procedures into one of three categories: “more 
effective”, “moderately effective”, and “less effective.”5  Each category represents a differing 
degree of effectiveness in detecting fraud in the stock and warehousing cycle.  Thus, an audit 
procedure is classified as “more effective” if its mean response exceeds the overall mean 
response by a significant difference at any of the conventional levels.  On the other hand, an 
audit procedure is classified as “less effective” if its mean response is below the overall mean 
response by a significant difference at any of the conventional levels.  Finally, an audit  
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procedure is classified as “moderately effective” if its mean response when tested against the 
overall mean response is not statistically significant. 
 
Perceptual differences 
To determine if there are any significant perceptual differences among the respondent 
auditors on the effectiveness of the 56 audit procedures in detecting fraud in stock and 
warehousing cycle on the basis of: (i) regional location, and (ii) type of audit firm, we tested 
the following null hypotheses with One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)6 and Two-
sample t-test respectively: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There are no regional perceptual differences on the effectiveness of the 
standard audit procedures in detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There are no perceptual differences between Big-5 and non-Big-5 auditors on 
the effectiveness of the standard audit procedures in detecting fraud in stock 
and warehousing cycle. 
 
Because the ANOVA is incapable of isolating which regional differences are significant, a 
posteriori Scheffe multiple-comparisons test was used to pinpoint which of the regions 
examined differ significantly (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). 
 
Auditor- and audit firm-specific factors 
To investigate the relative influence of: (i) size of audit firm; (ii) position tenure of auditor; 
(iii) years of experience of auditor; and (iv) practice review experience of auditor’s firm on 
the likelihood of detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle, we estimated the following 
logit regression model: 
 
εββββα jac jExp jPost jSize jFraudec j +++++= Pr4321   (1) 
 
Where, Fraudecj = dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if auditor j has detected 
fraud in the stock and warehousing cycle, and 0 otherwise; 
 α  = the constant term of the equation to be estimated; 
 1β   = the coefficient of independent variable to be estimated from the 
data, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4; 
 Sizej  = the size of audit firm where auditor j works; 
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 Postj  = the position tenure of auditor j; 
 Expj  = the years of experience of auditor j; 
 Pracj  = the practice review experience of auditor j’s firm; and 
 ε   = the stochastic disturbance term for auditor j. 
 
 
3. Analysis of the Survey Data 
 
Analysis of the survey data is organised under four major headings.  The first details the 
demographic characteristics of our respondents.  The second is about the perceptual 
effectiveness of the 56 audit procedures.  The third presents analysis on the perceptual 
differences between auditors operating in different geographical areas in NZ, and the type of 
audit firm.  The fourth concerns auditor- and audit firm-specific factors that influence the 
likelihood to detect fraud in stock and warehousing cycle. 
 
3.1 Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics 
 
As reported in Panels A and B of Table I below, about 93 percent of our respondents are 
members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ).  Of these, 58 
percent are in the ICANZ’s full membership category, and 27 percent of this figure work with 
Big-5 audit firms.  About 15 percent of our respondents are also qualified with other 
professional bodies such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, The 
Institute of Internal Auditors, and the ACFE. 
 
The number of years our respondents have been in their current positions range from four 
months to 26 years; with the average position tenure being about four years.  In contrast, our 
respondents have, on average, eight years of practical experience in auditing.  As reported in 
Panel B of Table I, there are significant differences between our respondents who are Big-5 
and non-Big-5 auditors on a number of variables including the location of their firms, 
practice review experience, and stock and warehousing cycle fraud detection experience.  The 
Big-5 firms have experienced significantly more practice reviews, and have detected more 
stock and warehousing cycle-related frauds than non-Big-5 firms.  With respect to individual 
respondents, however, no statistically significant differences were found in stock and 
warehousing cycle fraud detection experience of Big-5 and non-Big-5 auditors. 
 7
Table I 
Analyses of responses to demographic questions  
and respondents’ most frequent write-in comments 
 
Panel A: Metric variables 
Response Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
1. No. of years in present audit firm 109   6.55    6.80 0.5   32 1.856  5.893 
2. Position tenure 110   3.60    4.67 0.3   26 2.725 10.573 
3. No. of years of experience in auditing 110   7.69    7.27 0.5   35 1.554  5.270 
4. No. of staff of respondent’s employer 110 261.12 882.32   4 8500 7.982 72.016 
5. No. of years of ICANZ membership of 
     respondents 
105   5.63    7.13   0   35 2.046  6.997 
 
Panel B: Non-metric variables 
 
Response 
 
Obs.
Big-5 
firm 
Non-Big-5 
firm 
t-test 
______________
    t-value Prob.
1. Respondents’ ICANZ membership type: 
    Combined 
    Full 
    Provisional 
 
102 
 64 
 38 
 
55 
30 
25 
 
47 
34 
13 
 
 1.866 
 
0.065 
2. Respondents’ membership of other 
    professional bodies 
104 
 
55 49  0.249 0.804 
3. Respondents’ firms experiencing 
    practice review before 
110 
 
55 49 -3.709 0.000 
4. Respondents’ firms detecting fraud 
    in stock and warehousing cycle before 
92 
 
49 43 -2.555 0.012 
5. Respondents detecting fraud in stock 
    and warehousing cycle before 
104 55 49  0.781 0.437 
6. Regional location of respondents’ firms: 
    Combined 
    Auckland 
    Wellington 
    Christchurch 
    “Others” 
 
104 
 27 
 27 
 18 
 32 
 
55 
16 
18 
12 
 9 
 
49 
11 
 9 
 6 
23 
 
2.575 
 
 
0.011 
 
Panel C: Analysis of write-in comments (n = 35) 
Write-in comment 
(Some respondents made more than one comment) 
No. of 
respondents 
Proportion of
total (%) 
 1. Alterations on stock sheets attracted attention  2  4 
 2. Review stock security system  4  8 
 3. Attendance at stocktaking  5 10 
 4. Random testing outside stocktaking period  2  4 
 5. Identify controls over physical stock count  6 12 
 6. Just listening to what other staff have to say  2  4 
 7. Review variances from standard costs  3  6 
 8. Compare various margins and test other relationships  4  8 
 9. General knowledge of and close interaction with client  3  6 
10. There is no best way to detect fraud  3  6 
11. Audits are not designed to detect fraud  3  6 
12. Miscellaneous comments on control procedure (such as  key staff taking holidays,  
      segregation of duties, review of purchasing policies, e.t.c.) 
13 26 
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Table II 
Audit procedures evaluated as “more effective” in detecting fraud in stock and 
warehousing cycle by respondents (Overall mean response = 3.0365) 
 
     
 Audit procedure (By the order of perceived effectiveness) Mean Std. dev. t-value
 
     
 1. Review stock count procedures: [1] accounting for items in transit (in and out); [2] 
comparison of counts with stock records; and [3] reconciliation of differences 
between counts and stock records. 
3.827 0.985 8.421** 
 2. Follow up all exceptions to make sure they are resolved. 3.764 1.013 7.568** 
 3. Perform compilation tests to ensure that stock sheets total schedule agrees with the 
physical stock counts. 
3.609 0.968 6.202** 
 4. Verify that stock balances on stock sheets agree with perpetual records (stock 
subsidiary ledger). 
3.591 0.980 5.936** 
 5. Review adequacy of physical security for the entire stock. 3.518 1.098 4.600** 
 6. Review major adjustments for propriety. 3.509 1.139 4.350** 
 7. Trace stock listed in the schedule to stock tags and the auditor's recorded counts for 
existence, description, and quantity. 
3.482 1.081 4.319** 
 8. Review procedures for receiving, inspecting, and storing incoming items and for 
shipments out of the warehouse. 
3.482 0.955 4.889** 
 9. Determine if access to stock area is limited to only authorised personnel. 3.418 1.035 3.867** 
10. Re-count a sample of client's counts to make sure the recorded counts are accurate on 
the tags (also check descriptions and unit of count, such as dozen or gross). 
3.400 1.167 3.267** 
11. Observe the physical count of stock at all locations. 3.318 1.125 2.627** 
12. Obtain written confirmation of stocks in public warehouses. 3.245 1.118 1.959* 
13. Review related party transactions involving stock movements. 3.227 1.155 1.733* 
14. Trace from stock tags to the stock sheets and make sure stock on tags are included. 3.209 1.032 1.753* 
 
Note: * = Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test). 
        ** = Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test). 
 
 
3.2 Effective Audit Procedures 
 
The results gathered from the survey provide information on the respondents’ perception of 
the relative effectiveness of the 56 standard audit procedures.  The perceived effectiveness of 
the survey respondents on each audit procedure is summarized in Tables II, III and IV.  The 
first column of these tables presents the full text of each audit procedure.  The second through 
fourth columns represent the mean response, standard deviation, and t-test statistic for each 
audit procedure. 
 
Our respondents perceive 25 percent (14 of 56) of the standard audit procedures as being 
“more effective” than the average audit procedure in detecting fraud in stock and 
warehousing cycle.  Table II presents the auditors’ responses for each of the 14 “more 
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effective” audit procedures in the stock and warehousing cycle.  The mean response of the 
110 respondents for each of the 14 “more effective” audit procedures is greater than the 
overall mean response of 3.0365 which represents the effectiveness of an average audit 
procedure in detecting fraud in the stock and warehousing cycle.  The 14 “more effective” 
audit procedures are, generally, used to collect direct audit evidence in a typical audit 
engagement.  This suggests that they should be applied in the planning stage of an audit.  As 
suggested by Moyes (1996), early indication of possible fraud during the planning stage of an 
audit would allow auditors to re-plan more effectively, and maximise audit time and 
resources.  Twelve of the 14 “more effective” audit procedures were also perceived by US 
auditors as such (see Moyes, 1996). 
 
 
Table III 
Audit procedures evaluated as “moderately effective” in detecting fraud in stock and 
warehousing cycle by respondents (Overall mean response = 3.0365) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
     
 Audit procedure (By the order of perceived effectiveness) Mean Std. dev. t-value†
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
 1. Test pricing by tracing unit costs from vendors' invoices to the perpetual stock 
records. 
3.218 1.160 1.642 
 2. Perform purchases cut-off test to ensure that goods in transit on F.O.B. shipping point 
basis are recorded as purchases and included in stock. 
3.154 1.110 1.115 
 3. Trace shipments to sales records, stock records, and bills of lading (shipping 
documents). 
3.145 1.074 1.064 
 4. Identify slow-moving, obsolete, or damaged items within the stock. 3.136 1.062 0.986 
 5. Trace balances of stock-listing schedules to the general ledger. 3.127 1.110 0.858 
 6. Record client’s counts for subsequent testing. 3.118 1.115 0.768 
 7. Perform analytical procedures by computing ratios and comparing them with 
previous year’s. 
3.109 1.176 0.647 
 8. Verify pricing by locating the appropriate and sufficient invoices to account for the 
entire quantity of stock for the particular item being tested, especially for FIFO 
valuation method. 
3.091 1.146 0.498 
 9. Review warehouse records for duplicate locations for the same items. 3.091 1.019 0.560 
10. Review policies regarding stock returns. 3.082 1.059 0.448 
11. Tour warehouse facilities and become familiar with storage, marking, and location 
procedures. 
3.054 1.012 0.187 
12. Observe that damaged or obsolete goods are valued at net realizable value. 3.054 1.099 0.172 
13. Review the last shipping document used at year-end and make sure the stock for that 
item was excluded from the physical count. 
3.027 1.281 -0.076 
14. Trace stock tags identified as non- owned during the physical observation to the 
stock-listing schedule to make sure that they have not been included. 
3.018 1.149 -0.167 
15. Enquire about stocks in other locations, on consignment or on sale or return basis. 3.009 1.096 -0.262 
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Table III (Contd.): Audit procedures evaluated as “moderately effective” in detecting 
fraud in stock and warehousing cycle by respondents (Overall mean response = 3.0365) 
     
 Audit procedure (By the order of perceived effectiveness) Mean Std. dev. t-value†
 
16. Account for all used and unused tags to make sure none are lost, added or 
intentionally omitted (record tag numbers for those used and unused for subsequent 
follow-up). 
2.991 1.145 -0.418 
17. Trace shipments to sales daybooks. 2.982 1.165 -0.492 
18. Compare current stock levels and values with previous year’s and evaluate. 2.954 1.078 -0.797 
19. Review the last shipping document used at year-end to make sure the stock for that 
item was excluded from the physical count. 
2.945 1.240 -0.770 
20. If a standard cost system is used, determine if the valuation method is efficient and 
useful by reviewing and analysing the variances. 
2.936 1.034 -1.016 
21. Discuss with client management the stock and warehousing cycle. 2.936 1.144 -0.919 
22. Examine shipping area for stock set aside for shipment, but not counted. 2.918 1.068 -1.162 
23. Draw flow chart of internal control system and compare with written policies. 2.900 1.180 -1.213 
24. Determine whether costs should be included in the valuation of a particular item of 
purchased stock such as freight, storage, discounts, and other costs and compare the 
findings with the prior year's audit working papers to make sure the valuation 
methods are consistent. 
2.891 1.136 -1.344 
25. Examine stock descriptions on the tags and compare to the actual stock for raw 
materials, work in progress, and finished goods. 
2.882 1.081 -1.500 
26. Compare the classification of raw materials, work in progress, and finished goods by 
comparing the description on stock tags and the auditor's recorded test counts to the 
stock-listing schedule. 
2.873 1.158 -1.483 
27. Examine receiving area for stock that should be included in the physical count. 2.864 1.121 -1.618 
 
Note: † = None of the t-values is statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
 
 
Our respondents evaluated 27 (48 percent) audit procedures as being “moderately effective” 
in detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle.  The 27 “moderately effective” audit 
procedures are presented in Table III.  The mean response of each of these 27 “moderately 
effective” audit procedures are not statistically significant when tested against with the 
overall mean response of 3.0365, which represents the average effectiveness of an audit 
procedure to detect fraud in stock and warehousing cycle.  The 27 “moderately effective” 
audit procedures are generally used to verify the accuracy and dependability of a client 
company’s accounting records.  Thus, the 27 “moderately effective” audit procedures are 
substantive procedures used to prove the stock figure as genuine, accurate, and complete.  
Auditors use these “moderately effective” audit procedures to confirm management’s 
financial statement assertions about the stock and manufacturing costs, as the manufacturing 
costs are the basis for calculating the cost of stock.  Compared with the results reported by 
Moyes (1996), about 70 percent of these “moderately effective” audit procedures (19 of 27) 
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were perceived by US auditors as having “average” effectiveness in detecting fraud in the 
stock and warehousing cycle. 
 
Table IV 
Audit procedures evaluated as “less effective” in detecting fraud in stock and 
warehousing cycle by respondents (Overall mean response = 3.0365) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
     
 Audit procedure (By the order of perceived effectiveness) Mean Std. dev. t-value 
 1. Observe that non-owned goods are either identified or segregated. 2.864 1.062 -1.707* 
 2. Check the additions of the stock sheets for raw materials, work in progress, and 
finished goods. 
2.836 1.088 -1.929* 
 3. Extend the physical stock counts times the price on selected items on the stock 
summaries. 
2.809 1.062 -2.246** 
 4. Account for the direct material costs, direct labour costs, and overhead costs involved 
in the valuation of manufactured stocks. 
2.809 1.079 -2.210** 
 5. In pricing stock, consider whether historical or replacement cost is lower. 2.773 1.254 -2.207** 
 6. Compare current manufacturing costs with previous year’s. 2.764 1.074 -2.664*** 
 7. Review contracts with suppliers and customers and enquire of management about the 
possibility of the inclusion of consigned or other non-owned stock, or of owned that 
is not included. 
2.736 0.983 -3.202*** 
 8. Compare unit costs of stock determined either with FIFO, LIFO or AVCO valuation 
methods with previous year’s. 
2.736 1.201 -2.620** 
 9. Compare the count of larger items stated on the tags to the counts in the prior year 
and the perpetual stock records. 
2.727 1.108 -2.927*** 
10. Evaluate whether the percentage of completion recorded on the tags for work in 
progress is reasonable. 
2.591 1.016 -4.598*** 
11. Compare extended stock value with previous year’s. 2.536 1.089 -4.815*** 
12. Test direct labour costs by comparing with labour payroll and union contracts. 2.536 1.217 -4.311*** 
13. Send confirmations to lenders for pertinent details about warehouse receipts pledged 
as collateral for liabilities. 
2.482 1.359 -4.279*** 
14. Test number of hours needed to manufacture the product by comparing with 
engineering specifications. 
2.409 1.214 -5.421*** 
15. Examine financial statements for: [1] proper separate disclosure of raw materials, 
work in progress and finished goods; [2] proper description of the stock costing 
method; [3] inclusion of significant sales and purchase commitments; and [4] proper 
description of pledged stock. 
2.327 1.257 -5.918*** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: * = Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test). 
        ** = Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test). 
      *** = Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test). 
 
 
Table IV above presents the remaining 15 audit procedures evaluated by NZ auditors as 
having “less” effectiveness in detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle.  The mean 
response from the 110 respondents for each of the 15 “less effective” audit procedures is 
smaller than the 3.0365 overall mean, which represents the average effectiveness of an audit 
procedure in detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle.  These audit procedures appear 
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to be those used in collecting audit evidence in an indirect way.  They should not exclusively 
be used in an audit, especially if fraud is suspected.  Rather, they should be used to 
complement those procedures perceived by our respondents as having either of “more” or 
“average” effectiveness in detecting fraud.  Most of the 15 “less effective” fraud-detecting 
audit procedures are analytical procedures.  This result contradicts the general expectation 
that analytical procedures are useful in indicating client companies that are in severe financial 
difficulties – situation where managements are more likely to commit fraud.  The plausible 
reason for this result is that evidence gathered with analytical procedures is less objective. 
 
Write-in comments 
 
As stated earlier, respondents were given an opportunity to write in audit procedures other 
than those in the survey questionnaire that they have used to detect fraud in stock and 
warehousing cycle.  Of the respondents, 35 (32 percent) provided write-in comments.  
Comments made by these respondents are summarised in Panel C of Table I.  The most 
frequent comments deal with control procedures such as ensuring that key staff take holidays 
when due, and ensuring that there is proper segregation of compatible duties.  Other frequent 
comments mentioned include identifying controls over physical stock count, and attending 
stocktaking. 
 
Perceptual Differences 
Panels A and B of Table V respectively report the results of the statistical tests performed to 
determine if there are any perceptual differences between our respondents on the 
effectiveness of the 56 standard audit procedures in detecting fraud in stock and warehousing 
cycle on the basis of: (i) the geographical area in NZ where respondents’ employers are 
located, and (ii) the type of audit firm that employs our respondent auditors. 
 
Regional perceptual differences 
In most cases, our respondents do agree on the degree of effectiveness of the 56 standard 
audit procedures used in stock and warehousing audit cycle, except for those six instances 
reported in Panels A of Table V.  Thus, hypothesis 1 can be rejected in 50 of the cases 
investigated.  Of the six cases in which our respondents differ in their perception, a posteriori 
Scheffe multiple-comparisons test indicates that auditors practising in Wellington, and those 
practising outside the three major centres in NZ, categorised as “others” in this study for 
statistical purposes, differ significantly on the effectiveness of two audit procedures in 
detecting fraud.7 
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Table V 
Auditors’ perceptual differences on the effectiveness of audit procedures in detecting 
fraud in stock and warehousing cycle 
 
      
Panel A: By area of location: Auckland v. Wellington v. Christchurch v. “Others” (n=110) 
 
  
Audit procedure 
Anova test 
_________________
Kruskal-Wallis test 
__________________
  F-statistic Prob. Chi-squared Prob. 
      
 1. Review contracts with suppliers and customers and enquire from 
management about the possibility of the inclusion of consigned or 
other non-owned stock, or of owned that is not included. 
2.95 0.034††   7.153 0.067 
 2. Examine receiving area for stock that should be included in the 
physical count. 
2.28 0.084   7.557 0.056 
 3. Observe that non-owned goods are either identified or segregated. 2.29 0.083   6.078  0.108† 
 4. Verify pricing by locating the appropriate and sufficient invoices 
to account for the entire quantity of stock for the particular item 
being tested, especially for FIFO valuation method. 
3.84 0.012††† 12.162 0.007 
 5. In pricing stock, consider whether historical or replacement cost is 
lower. 
2.36 0.0759   6.949 0.0736 
 6. Check the additions of the stock-listing schedules for raw 
materials, work in progress, and finished goods. 
2.14 0.0997   7.085 0.0692 
 
Panel B: By auditor-type: Big-5 v. non-Big-5 (n=104) 
  
Audit procedure 
t-test 
_________________
Mann-Whitney test 
__________________
  t-value Prob. Z-statistic Prob. 
 
 1. Enquire about stocks in other locations, on consignment or on sale 
or return basis. 
 1.780 0.075  1.796 0.072 
 2. Trace balances of stock-listing schedules to the general ledger. -1.927 0.057 -1.787 0.074 
 3. Identify slow-moving, obsolete, or damaged items within the 
stock. 
 1.758 0.082  1.656 0.098 
 4. Review major adjustments for propriety.  1.615  0.110†  2.262 0.024 
 5. Review related party transactions involving stock movements.  2.445 0.016  2.188 0.029 
 
Note: † = Not significant at any of the conventional levels. 
         †† = Scheffe multiple-comparisons test shows that auditors located in Wellington and those in 
other areas in New Zealand (categorised as “others” for statistical purposes) differ 
significantly on this audit procedure at the 10% level. 
       ††† = Scheffe multiple-comparisons test shows that auditors located in Wellington and those in 
other areas in New Zealand (categorised as “others” for statistical purposes) differ 
significantly on this audit procedure at the 5% level. 
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Type of audit firm perceptual differences 
Again, our statistical test suggests that there are no significant perceptual differences between 
Big-5 and non-Big-5 auditors on the effectiveness of the 56 standard audit procedures, except 
in five instances.  Panel B of Table V presents these audit procedures, which our respondents 
differ on the basis of the type of audit firm employing them.  Thus, hypothesis 2 is not 
substantiated in 51 cases.8  This result is surprising given that the two types of auditors 
significantly differ on a number of demographic characteristics examined in this study, and 
reported in Panel B of Table I.  This result raises concern about the economic rent enjoyed by 
Big-5 audit firms.  If Big-5 firms do not significantly differ from non-Big-5 counterparts in 
their use of audit procedures to detect fraud, why should the Big-5 audit firms enjoy 
economic rent?  Presumably, they enjoy economic rent because of their reputation, and are 
perceived as having greater ability to pay damages. 
 
Auditor- and Audit Firm-specific Factors 
We report the results of the logit regression analysis in Table VI.  To avoid the consequences 
of multicollinearity because of the high correlation between the auditor’s years of experience 
in auditing, and auditor’s position tenure variables9, two logit regression models (Models A 
and B) were fitted to the data.  Model A includes all variables except for auditor’s years of 
experience in auditing, while Model B includes all variables except for auditor’s position 
tenure.  Panel B of Table VI presents the correlation matrix of the auditor- and audit firm-
specific factors investigated, while the results of the Models A and B10 are reported in Panels 
C and D of Table VI respectively. 
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Table VI 
Results of Logit Regression 
 
Model: εββββα jac jExp jPost jSize jFraudecj +++++= Pr4321  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of auditor- and audit firm-specific factors 
 
Variable Notation in model Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max 
No. of employees Sizej 110 261.13 882.32  4 8500 
Position tenure (years) Postj 110 3.60 4.67 .3     26 
Years of experience Expj 110 7.69 7.27 .5     35 
Practice review Pracj 110 .75   .43  0       1 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix of auditor- and audit firm-specific factors 
 
Variable No. of employees Position tenure Years of experience Practice review 
No. of employees  1.0000 -0.0371  0.0062 -0.0819 
Position tenure (years) -0.0371  1.0000  0.7997*  0.0956 
Years of experience  1.0062  0.7997*  1.0000  0.0883 
Practice review -0.0819  0.0956 -0.0819  1.0000 
 
Panel C: Model A (All variables included except for auditor’s years of experience) 
 
Logit estimates Number of observation  = 110 
 Wald Chi-squared(3) = 15.26 
 Prob. > Chi-squared =   0.0016 
Log likelihood = -48.058963 Pseudo R-squared =   0.1039 
 
 
 
Fraudecj 
Robust 
Coefficient 
 
Std. Err. 
 
z 
 
P>⎮z⎮ 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
Sizej ( (+)    .0003806 .000171  2.226 0.026    .0000454   .0007158 
Postj (+)    .1345041 .0418246  3.216 0.001    .0565694   .2164788 
Pracj (+)    .3647092 .6383185  0.571 0.568   -.8863721  1.61579 
Constant (?) -2.428866 .5750908 -4.223 0.000 -3.556024 -1.301709 
 
Panel D: Model B (All variables included except for auditor’s position tenure) 
Logit estimates Number of observation = 110 
 Wald Chi-squared(3) = 15.87 
 Prob.>Chi-squared =   0.0012 
Log likelihood = -46.827845 Pseudo R-squared =   0.1268 
 
 
Fraudecj 
Robust 
Coefficient 
 
Std. Err. 
 
z 
 
P>⎮z⎮ 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
Sizej (+)    .000358 .0001672  2.141 0.032    .0000302    .0006857 
Expj (+)    .1040997 .0315567  3.299 0.001    .0422498  1.659497 
Pracj (+)    .3691132 .643012  0.574 0.566   -.8911671  1.629393 
Constant (?) -2.799416 .6243265 -4.484 0.000 -4.023073 -1.575758 
 
 
Note: * = Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test). 
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The results of Model A indicate that auditor’s position tenure, and the size of audit firm are 
significant at the conventional levels of 1% and 5% respectively.  The results of an estimate 
of Model B indicate that the auditor’s years of experience in auditing, and the size of audit 
firm variables are statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively.  The coefficient 
on the practice review experience of auditor’s firm variable is statistically insignificant in 
both models.  Apparently, the size of audit firm, measured by number of employees, plays a 
significant role in the likelihood of fraud detection.  More employees represent a larger pool 
of accumulated expertise pertaining to fraud especially in dealing with stock.  Hence, the 
larger the audit firm, the more likely the application of stock and warehousing audit 
procedures in an audit engagement will locate fraud involving stock.  In both models, the 
coefficients on auditor’s position tenure, auditor’s years of experience, and the size of audit 
firm are all of the excepted signs; suggesting that these variables positively influence the 
likelihood to detect fraud in stock and warehousing cycle in NZ. 
 
Overall, the results of the regression analysis suggest that size of audit firm, measured by the 
number of employees, auditor’s position tenure, and auditor’s years of experience in auditing 
are significant predictors of the likelihood of detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle 
in NZ.  The Wald Chi-squared statistic, which is comparable to the F-statistic of a multiple 
regression, tests the hypothesis that all the parameters in the Equation (1) are simultaneously 
equal to zero.  This null hypothesis is not substantiated, as the Wald Chi-squared statistic of 
the two models is statistically significant at the 1% level.  However, the Pseudo R-squared, 
which is comparable to the R-squared measure in a multiple regression, does not indicate a 
better fit of the data in both models.  We examined the sensitivity of the results of both 
models to other specifications, and find the results reported in Panels C and D of Table VI to 
be quite robust.11 
 
 
 17
4. Conclusions and Limitations 
 
The major purpose of this study is to explore the degree of effectiveness of 56 standard audit 
procedures normally applied in the stock and warehousing cycle as perceived by auditors in 
NZ.  Further, it investigates the relative influence of the size of audit firm, auditor’s position 
tenure, auditor’s years of experience in auditing, and practice review experience of auditor’s 
firm on the likelihood of detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle. 
 
The analysis of the usable questionnaire returned by the surveyed auditors indicates that 
relatively few (less than half) of the 56 standard audit procedures are perceived by our 
respondents as being “more effective” than average audit procedure in detecting fraud in 
stock and warehousing cycle in NZ.  On the other hand, they evaluated more than half of 
these procedures as “moderately effective”, and 15 as “less effective” in detecting fraud 
likely to be perpetuated in the stock and warehousing cycle in NZ. 
 
A univariate analysis reveals no statistically significant perceptual differences on the 
effectiveness of the 56 standard audit procedures evaluated by our respondent auditors on the 
basis of the geographical location of their employers in NZ, and the type of audit firm (Big-5 
versus Non-Big-5) that employs them. 
 
In addition, a logit regression analysis suggest that the size of audit firm, auditor’s position 
tenure, and auditor’s years of experience increase the possibility of detecting fraud that has 
been perpetuated in the stock and warehousing cycle.  However, practice review experience 
of auditor’s firm was found to make statistically insignificant contribution to the likelihood of 
detecting fraud in stock and warehousing cycle in NZ. 
 
The results reported here should be considered in the light of the following limitations of the 
underlying research.  First, the 56 audit procedures evaluated by our respondents in this study 
do not represent all the available audit procedures to detect fraud in stock and warehousing 
cycle.  They are limited to those found in a typical auditing textbook.  However, to include all 
available audit procedures relevant in this transaction cycle would have been impossible.  
Second, the respondent auditors are assumed to be experts in understanding and applying all 
these audit procedures.  Their perception of the effectiveness of the audit procedures may be 
affected by the fact that they do not suffer any economic loss.  Third, responses to 
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questionnaire by individuals may not always reflect practice.  Given the above limitations, 
caution should be exercised in making generalizations based on the results. 
 
In conclusion, the likelihood of fraud detection in stock and warehousing increases as the 
auditor acquires more years of auditing experience, and as the audit firm employs more 
number of staff.  Exploring the nature of these relationships, either in other transaction cycles 
or the same transaction cycle in other countries may be interesting areas for future research. 
 
NOTES 
1. For the purpose of this study, fraud is defined as “an intentional deception, misappropriation of a 
company’s assets or the manipulation of its financial data to the advantage of the perpetrator” (Levy, 
1985, p. 78).  It also includes an array of irregularities and illegal acts characterised by intentional 
misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in accounting records or financial statements; 
intentional false accounting or misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, 
classification, manner of presentation or disclosure; and misappropriation of assets (American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA], 1997). 
 
2. Although functional activities of companies are inter-twined, auditors often view them as highly 
integrated sets of five cycles known as transaction cycles.  The auditing literature provides typical 
examples of the five transaction cycles: (i) purchase and payment cycle; (ii) stock and warehousing 
cycle; (iii) sales and collection cycle; (iv) payroll and personnel cycle; and (v) capital acquisition cycle.  
This study focuses exclusively on the detection of fraud in the functional activity of stock and 
warehousing cycle. 
 
3. The survey instrument was revised following a pilot testing on 100 auditors.  Of the 33 auditors who 
responded to the pilot, only 26 were usable.  The revised survey instrument was mailed to our stratified 
sampling units.  A copy of the survey instrument is available, on request, from the first author. 
 
4. A concern in mailed survey research is that of non-response bias.  To assess the potential effect of non-
response bias, a procedure recommended by Oppenheim (1992) was used.  Thus, the respondents were 
divided into two categories: early and late respondents, and then, the two categories were compared on 
nine demographic characteristics.  The results of our test of non-response bias suggest that there are no 
significant differences between early and late respondents on these demographic characteristics. 
 
5. This classification procedure facilitates discussion of our results. 
 
6. Because the assumption of equal variance is not supported by the data, the non-parametric counterpart, 
Kruskal-Wallis test, was also employed.  Gaito (1980, p. 567) emphasises the importance of this 
requirement for an ANOVA test. 
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7. For brevity, the result of this supplementary analysis is not reported here. 
 
8. In another analysis, the type of audit firm variable was found not to be statistically significant.  In this 
analysis, the type of audit firm was included in Equation (1) as a categorical variable where it was 
coded one if it is a Big-5 audit firm, and zero otherwise. 
 
9. As reported in Panel B of Table VI, the pairwise Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for 
these variables is 0.80.  This suggests a serious multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 1995).  
Simultaneous inclusion of these variables in Equation (1) results in changes in the signs of some of the 
parameter estimates. 
 
10. Because the estimated residuals of the models were serially correlated, logit models with robust 
standard errors were run.  Standard errors of parameter estimates of a model with serially correlated 
residuals are biased, and predictions based on the estimates are inefficient (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). 
 
11. We estimated a probit specification of Equation (1) for both Models A and B.  The results in each case 
are qualitatively similar to the logit results, and in the interests of brevity, are not reported here.  Note 
that the difference between logit and probit regressions is about the assumption of the distribution of 
the independent variables.  The probit regression requires that the independent variables be normally 
distributed (Maddala, 1991). 
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